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TIMINGCOMPARISONS
TIMING RELATIONS can be examined by dating the fluctuations in the
series concerned, identifying the movements that match, and measur-
ing the leads and lags between the corresponding turning points. In this
chapter, such measures are presented for the available data on new or-
ders, production, and shipments. The analysis proceeds from series
relating to individual products and industries, mostly in physical units,
to value aggregates for the major divisions and some subdivisions of
the manufacturing sector. The former group covers mainly the inter-
war period; the second group, the post-World War II period. Measures
of relative timing in the recent years are also presented for several
broadly defined market categories and for a set of deflated major-in-
dustry series on new orders and shipments as well as the correspond-
ing production indexes.
Rules about the dating and matching of turning points have been de-
veloped and applied in the business cycle studies of the National Bu-
reau. These rules, however, are merely designed to discipline the re-
searcher's judgment, not substitute for it. In general, the turning points
to be identified are the local maxima and minima in the series con-
cerned, subject to certain constraints relating to the duration of the
movements thus dated: very short peak-to-peak or trough-to-trough
fluctuations do not qualify as "specific cycles." The presence of suf-
ficiently marked and long movements must be established first; the
precise dating of the turning points comes next. Occasionally, an ex-
tremely high or low standing of the series is so isolated that it seems
to be the result of some random event or very short-term "irregularity"
rather than the culmination of a longer cyclical process. In such cases,
a less extreme value of the series, which is surrounded by similar val-130Relationships Between New Orders, Production, and Shipments
ues, would be selected instead; in other words, a "broader" peak or
trough may be preferred to a higher or lower but "narrow" standing
(say, a single-month high point occurring at a time when the series still
shows a rising trend). Smoothing can help to identify the turns, and we
do consult short-term averages (mostly of three to six months) as the
need arises; but smoothing may also distort and bias the dating, and
caution must be exercised not to let this happen. Whether or not mov-
ing averages were used as an aid in the dating process, the dates always
refer to the unsmoothed series (after seasonal adjustment).'
Individual Industries or Products
Relative Timing of New Orders and Shipments
GOODS MADE TO ORDER. The first set of timing comparisons (Table
4-1) is based on eleven pairs of series for new orders and shipments,
representing goods manufactured primarily to order. There are nine
producer durable items equally divided between iron and steel prod-
ucts, machinery, and railway equipment; one consumer durable prod-
uct (furniture); and one nondurable (paper). Seven of the comparisons
are between physical series, and four employ current-value data (these
are the machinery items—electric overhead cranes, machine tools, and
woodworking machinery —andfurniture).
Table 4-1 demonstrates that in manufacture of this type new orders
lead shipments with a very high degree of regularity. This general find-
ing can be viewed as a statistical reflection of a fairly obvious causal
relation. Indeed, it is not the leading pattern of new orders itself but
the few lapses from it that might need explanation. Of these, however,
some are probably spurious, a result of the difficulty of marking a spe-
cific peak or trough in a jagged turning segment.
On the dating of specific cycles, see Arthur F. Burns and Wesley C. Mitchell, MeasuringBusi-
ness Cycles, NewYork, NBER, 1946, pp. 56—66. The rules followed in matching the specific-cycle
burns in two activities are analogous to those for the timing observations at business cycle turns
(ibid.,pp.116—28). The turns in the series to be compared were, as a general procedure, dated in-
dependently, with the aid of these rules. Individual timing comparisons based on such markings may
well deviate from the expected patterns; but unless the results were clearly unsatisfactory and ca-
pable of reasonable improvement, we were careful not to modify the markings made according to
the accepted rules. This insured against arbitrary decisions or inadvertent forcing of the evidence.
As another safeguard, the turning points in most of the series used in this book were dated inde-
pendently by another member of the NBER staff. The consensus between the dates was very good,
though some differences remained, of course, and were resolved by the author's decision. The as-
sistance in this work by the late Miss Sophie Sakowitz is gratefully acknowledged.Timing Comparisons 131
The quantitative aspects of the data in Table 4-1 are of primary in-
terest. The average leads of new orders at shipment turns (column 10)
vary over a wide range of from eleven to less than two months. The
items are ranked by the length of these leads, from longest to shortest.
Railway equipment, heavy and specialized machinery, and structural
steel (which includes some of the most elaborate steel products) con-
stitute the upper part of the list, with mean leads of six months and
more. Industries or groups of commodities that are presumably less
heavily weighted with complex or specialized types of product —pig
iron, steel sheets, paper products, furniture, and woodworking machin-
ery —arecharacterized by shorter average leads (four months and less).
Coincidences, lags, and short leads of three months or less are much
more frequent, relative to all leads, at the bottom than at the top of the
table (see columns 5—8).Thisis a suggestive array, although with the
amount and type of data on hand we would not wish to push the matter
beyond the broad observations offered.
The leads of orders vary substantially, not only between the differ-
ent industries and products but also between successive observations
for any single item in the table. The extent of their intercycle varia-
bility may be judged from the figures in columns 11 and 12, which ought
to be read along with the corresponding entries in columns 9 and 10
(the former being average deviations of the individual timing compar-
isons, and the latter the mean leads from which they are measured).
The average deviations vary from five to less than two months and tend
to be larger in the upper than in the lower part of the table. They are
thus positively associated with the corresponding mean leads, a rela-
tion that is probably not uncommon. However, other things aside, it
takes a larger average deviation to cast doubt upon the nature of a tim-
ing relation when the mean lead is long than when it comes close to
zero.2
2Thus, when the mean timing figure is —11.0, even an average deviation of five months will not
disqualify it as an indication of leads of substantial duration (this is the situation for railroad pas-
senger cars). On the other hand, an average deviation of five months associated with a mean of, say,
—1.0 or less, would point to the presence of leads and lags of significant length at the individual turns;
an average of such mutually offsetting observations would not be likely to represent any consistent
timing patterns.
A comment should be added on the type of averages and variability measures used. For the data
in this section, means and mean absolute deviations were computed some time ago, following the
standard procedures then used by the business cycle unit of the National Bureau. Extension of the
analysis to other measures such as medians and standard deviations appeared unwarranted. How-
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.134Relationships Between New Orders, Production, and Shipments
The leads of new orders for the same group of products were on the
whole longer at the peaks than at the troughs in shipments. The aver-
age of all peak observations for the eleven items covered in Table 4-1
is a lead of 7.2 months; the corresponding mean for the trough observa-
tions is 5.4months.Since the capacity position of many firms at top
levels of output and deliveries is presumably strained, longer average
leads of orders at peaks conform to the economist's expectations.3
However, in only seven components of this sample do the mean leads
at peaks exceed those at troughs, in five of them by large margins. This
is not a fully convincing record, but some additional evidence in sup-
port of the longer peak leads will be provided by timing comparisons
for other groups of data.
GOODS MADE TO STOCK. Table 4-2 presents the timing measures for
a sample of seven durable goods made primarily to stock. Of these, five
are used principally by consumers (oil burners and the four items of
enameled sanitary ware), and two are used principally by producers
(oak flooring and southern pine lumber). This group of products con-
trasts with the sample of Table 4-1, representing manufactures to or-
der. There we dealt mainly with producer goods: metal products and
equipment for industry and transportation, including goods that are
highly complex or specialized or large-unit and expensive. Here we
have a small group of items that are much more standardized and closer
to the needs of consumers, associated most of all with residential con-
struction.
Tables 4-1 and 4-2 are arranged in the same manner, so that it is
easy to compare them by corresponding columns. Together, the two
tables include all but one of the individual industries or products for
which we have matched series on new orders and shipments.4
An extension of this argument leads to the presumption that "a good index of orders is likely to
prove a better forecaster of business cycle recessions than of business cycle revivals" (Wesley C.
Mitchell and Arthur F, Burns, Statistical Indicators of Cyclical Revivals, NBER Bulletin 69, 1938
(reprinted in Geoffrey H. Moore, ed., Business Cycle Indicators, Princeton for NBER, 1961, Vol. I,
p. 182, n. 13).
4The one exception to this is foundry equipment, which proved particularly difficult to classify.
For lack of data the test of the Q/U ratios could not be applied to it. According to information re-
ceived from the Foundry Equipment Manufacturers' Association, this is a very heterogeneous group
of products. Time lags of shipments against orders are reported to vary greatly among the different
types of equipment, ranging from as low as 3 to 4 weeks to as high as 9 to 12 months. The proportion
of short orders cannot be reliably estimated, although an inspection of the charts suggests that it
might be large, since there is a good deal of parallelism between the cyclical fluctuations as well as
the seasonal patterns in new orders and shipments.Timing Comparisons 135
The timing patterns of the two groups of data are distinctly different.
The leads of new orders over shipments tend to be both shorter and
less regular for the sample of goods made to stock than for that of
goods made to order. The average of all the individual comparisons
underlying the timing measures shown in Table 4-2 is a lead of 1.2
months. The corresponding over-all average in Table 4-1 is a lead of
6.3 months. None of the products sold mainly from stock shows a
mean lead of orders of more than two months. The longest of these
leads differs little from the shortest of the comparable leads for the
group of items made to order: the last of the ranked entries in column
10 of Table 4-1 is —1.6; the first of the ranked entries in column 10 of
Table 4-2 is —1.9. In other words, there appears to be little overlap
between the two arrays: the one for made-to-order commodities stops
descending (toward ever shorter leads) approximately where the other
begins.
At troughs, the timing of orders and shipments is synchronous, or
very nearly so, for each of the products covered in Table 4-2. Two
order series lag, on average, and one is coincident (column 9). At peaks,
the timing means, with one exception, are all leads. In each case these
averages indicate that there is more of a tendency for new orders to
lead shipments at peaks than at troughs. However, this tendency is
weak; the timing of the two variables for this group of products is
characterized by rough coincidence (including short leads or lags of
three months or less, and "exact" coincidences). The weighted timing
averages for the group as a whole are —2.0 months at peaks and —0.4
months at troughs. Even at peaks, then, the central tendency is toward
a short lead within the roughly coincident range.
The variability of the timing observations for goods made to stock is
large (columns 11 and 12). For all turns matched in this set of com-
parisons, the average deviation from the mean lead of only 1.2 months
is 2.6 months.
SUMMARY. Table 4-3 presents distributions of all timing comparisons
between new orders and shipments for the two groups of products.
Here the nature of the differentiation among the recorded comparisons
—whether itis due to intercycle or to interindustry variation—is
disregarded. The figures provide further demonstration of the contrast












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































reach up into the classes of very long leads, show the highest frequencies
in the classes running from —4 to —12 months, and recede in the regions
of coincidences and lags. For goods made to stock the classes of very
long leads are empty, and those of short leads and coincidences most
heavily populated (compare columns 5—7 with columns 8—10). Ap-
proximately two-thirds of all observations for goods made to order are
intermediate and long leads of more than three months, while nearly
three-fourths of all observations for goods made to stock are rough
coincidences.
Relative Timing of New Orders and Output
The sample of individual industries for which we have matched
data on new orders and output (all in physical terms) is, regrettably,
very small. It includes three of the items that represented manufac-
turing to order in Table 4-1 (merchant pig iron, steel sheets, and paper),
two of the products made primarily to stock from Table 4-2 (oak floor-
ing and southern pine lumber), and one commodity made primarily to
order, for which no comparisons with shipments could be made
(paperboard).
Timing comparisons between new orders and production based on
these data are summarized in Table 4-4. They demonstrate the tend-
ency for the turns in new orders to anticipate the turns in output. All
of the timing averages in columns 9—10 are leads of new orders, al-
though most of these leads are short, about 3 months or less. The mean
leads at troughs are shorter than those at peaks for all but one item. Of
the observations at peaks, somewhat more than half are rough coin-
cidences; of the observations at troughs, over two-thirds.
For the four made-to-order items, the average lead at all turns is 2.6
months, and for the two made to stock, it happens to be the same.
There is no evidence here of any significant differentiation between
the timing patterns of the two groups. This is consistent with the no-
tion that new orders guide and hence anticipate production even in
those industries in which they are customarily filled from stock shortly
after receipt.
However, it would be rash to make further generalizations from
this meager evidence. It would be unwise to infer that the lags of out-
puts, unlike those of shipments, are not likely to differ systematically






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.142Relationships Between New Orders, Production, and Shipments
facture to stock. The timing records of Table 4-4 cannot support such
a generalization. The difficulty here is due not only to the smallness
but to the character of the sample. That is, the items covered, in terms
of the order-shipment comparisons, belong to the least differentiated
segments of our two samples; those segments which show the contrast
between the two types of manufacture most clearly are omitted (be-
cause corresponding production data are not available). Merchant pig
iron, steel sheets, and paper are found in the lower part of Table 4-1,
that is, among the made-to-order products that have short leads of
orders relative to shipments. Oak flooring and southern pine lumber,
again, are located in the upper part of Table 4-2; they rank first and
third according to the length of their order leads among the components
of the made-to-stock group. The accompanying tabulation compares
the mean leads of orders relative to production with the mean leads of
orders relative to shipments for the same groups of commodities. The
to-order group therefore includes only three items: merchant pig
iron; paper, excluding building paper, newsprint, and paperboard; and
steel sheets. The to-stock group, however, includes both oak flooring
and southern pine lumber, as in Table 4-4.
Average Lead of New Orders at:
Peaks Troughs All Turns
(figuresin parentheses arethe
correspondingaveragedeviations)
Three items made to order
Comparisons with production—5.0(3.8)—2.1(2.8)—3.4(3.5)
Comparisons with shipments—5.2(3.0)—2.0(2.3)—3.5(3.0)
Two items made to stock
Comparisons with production —2.1(2.5)—3.0(2.0)—2.6(2.3)
Comparisons with shipments—2.3(2.4)—0.9(1.5)—1.6(2.0)
These figures do show the lead of new orders at all turns in output
to be somewhat longer for goods made to order than for goods made
to stock, but they make it clear that this is due entirely to the char-
acteristics of the timing at peaks, not at troughs.5 In the comparisons
with shipments, on the other hand, order leads are shorter for goods
5The average leads in the first line of the tabulation above are longer than those in Table 4-4 be-
cause paperboard has been excluded from the group of goods made to order. We have no shipment
data for paperboard, and wish to cover in the tabulation only those products for which we can com-
pare new orders with bothshipmentsand production.Timing Comparisons 143
made to stock, at both troughs and peaks. As a result, the difference in
the timing of orders for the two groups of goods at all turns is less for
the comparisons with production.
Small differences between averages based on small numbers of ob-
servations are, of course, of dubious statistical significance; they are
presented here as only mildly suggestive. But these observations do
seem sensible in view of our expectations: that output and shipments
would be closely synchronous in manufacture to order; that output
would lag behind orders, too, though probably only slightly, in man-
ufacture to stock; and that even those manufacturers who ordinarily
work to stock would become more "order oriented" when their busi-
ness was at its peak levels.
Major-Industry Aggregates
This section deals with the relative timing measures for the OBE-Cen-
sus series on the value of manufacturers' new orders and shipments,
and also compares the timing of deflated series for N and S and the
corresponding production indexes. The major-industry data for these
comparisons were described in Chapter 3 and shown there in several
charts.
These charts will be referred to repeatedly and should be consulted.
They elucidate both the strengths and the weaknesses of the method of
analyzing cyclical timing relations. They show turning points that are
easily identified, along with others that are less certain and a few that
are rather problematic. They convey a strong impression of the (ex-
pected) parallelism between the matched series, allowing for the greater
amplitudes and earlier timing of new orders. But they also provide ex-
amples of shipments "skipping" certain cyclical turns and movements
in orders. They show both that which is continuous and that which is
episodic, and thus supplement effectively the timing observations at
turning points and the regression measures that summarize average
relationships over time.
New Ordersvs. Shipments:Timing Comparisons
at Successive Peaks and Troughs
Table 4-5 lists the individual leads of new orders at successive turn-




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Notes to Table 4-5
n.s. =noturn in shipments.
n.i.not identified (timing of new orders or shipments or both uncertain).
n.a. =datanot available.
n.t.no turning points.
Note: Measures for all manufacturing industries; durable goods industries, total; and
nondurable goods industries, total; and measures on the other lines in columns 6—12 are
based on the new Census data (1963 revision). The other measures are based on the
earlier OBE data (the revised series for the component industries begin in 1953).
aThesepairs of peaks or troughs represent "extra" turns, not related to any cyclical
recession or revival recognized as such in the National Bureau chronology of U.S. busi-
ness cycles. The timing comparisons in columns 11 and 12 refer for the most part to the
dates marking the beginning and end of minor movements or retardations (see Charts
3-1 and 3-2).
bBasedon peaks that occurred in April—June 1959, before the major steel strike in the
second half of the year. After the strike, shipments rose again briefly to about the same
peak levels in January 1960, while the increase in new orders was much smaller and still
shorter (Chart 3-1).
The length of these leads is partly a consequence of the 1956 steel strike. The peaks
in new orders have on this occasion definitely preceded, and the peaks in shipments
definitely followed, the strike (see Chart 3-2).
dPrestrikepeaks in the first half of 1959 (Chart 3-2).
The pre-1953 measures are based in part on unpublished data received from the U.S.
Department of Commerce, Office of Business Economics.
show only a short and small decline between January and July 1951. New
orders, however, fell substantially between January 1951 and January 1952. These
comparisons match major and minor turns (Chart 3-2).
gReferto dates marking the beginning and end of a retardation in shipments (Septem-
ber 1959—February 1961). The former date is matched with the June 1959 peak in new
orders, and the latter date with a minor trough in new orders in March 1961 (see Chart
3-2).
Basedon the secondary peak in new nrders in December 1956, which matches the
peak in shipments in August 1957. The comparisons between extra turns which oc-
curred in these series in 1955—56 are not shown in this table (see Chart 3-2).
1Includesprofessional and scientific instruments; lumber; furniture; stone, clay, and
glass; and miscellaneous industries:
These measures may be questioned because they refer to movements with very small
amplitudes which are particularly difficult to date (see Chart 3-1).
kIncludestextiles, leather, paper, and printing and publishing.
ings. Eight of the twelve columns of the table refer to "turning zones"
associated with the recessions and revivals in general economic activ-
ity. This arrangement is possible because the series covered conform
well to business cycles, as suggested by Charts 3-I and 3-2 and shown
in detail later (Chapter 11). However, new orders also show wide-
spread "extra" cycles associated with the Korean developments in146Relationships Between New Orders, Production, and Shipments
1950—52, which in some of the industries are matched by movements
in shipments. Also, the slowdown of the economy in 1962 has been
connected with retardations or declines (mostly mild and short) in new
orders and shipments of several major industries. Thus Table 4-5 dis-
tinguishes twelve turning-point zones in the period covered by our data
—eight corresponding to the recent business cycle chronology, as de-
termined by the National Bureau, and four (columns 3—4 and 11—12)
relating to two special episodes.
Most of the recorded comparisons for the durable goods industries
in the Korean period are short leads and coincidences, but it would be
wrong to conclude that the actual delivery periods were then generally
short. One must stress the fact that no comparisons can be made in
these turning zones for the machinery and transportation equipment
industries and indeed for the most comprehensive aggregates —allman-
ufacturing and total durables. The rapid expansion of new orders in
1950—5 1left shipments far behind, resulting in a large-scale backlog
accumulation. Even after their drastic decline in 1951, new orders still
exceeded shipments; that is, the stock of unfilled orders kept on ex-
panding through that period, though shipments continued their gradual
rise. This implies that the delivery lags must have been very long and
increasing in this period. The evidence of the backlog-shipment ratios
bears out this presumption (Chapter 6). The method of turning-point
comparisons obviously cannot provide the relevant measures where
movements in new orders are not matched in shipments.
The rapid sequence of a buying surge and relapse in 1950—51 was
followed in 1952—53 by a rather hesitant rise of new orders, with ship-
ments now moving closely along. Only in the transportation equipment
industry did new orders continue to exceed shipments in this phase;
and then, when orders finally turned down decisively at the outset of
1953, shipments remainedat high levels for seven more months before
declining in July 1953 (Chart 3-2). Judging from the old OBEseries
for motor vehicles and nonautomotive transportation equipment sep-
arately, the lags of shipments behind new orders at the 1952—5 3 peaks
were apparently long in both of these industries (see Chart 3-4). Else-
where, the paired series nearly overlapped, and in some industries (pri-
mary metals and nonelectrical machinery) shipments in fact exceeded
new orders most of the time in 1952—53; shipments were coincident
with new orders or lagging by short intervals at the 1953 downturns.Timing Comparisons 147
On the whole, however, unfilled orders were still very high at the time,
absolutely and relative to shipments, and the lags in the comprehensive
aggregates were substantial (see Table 4-5, column 5, and the charts).
In 1953 new orders for durable goods dropped sharply, while output
and shipments, cushioned by the still large backlogs, declined but
slightly. At the end of the year, the decline in new orders was halted,
but there was very little rise in the following eight months: Between
September 1953 and May 1954, durables orders, after seasonal ad-
justment, remained virtually stable at monthly rates of about $10 bil-
lion (Chart 3-1). Most manufacturers apparently did not think this
situation justified a prompt response of stepped-up activity. The mild
business contraction then in process was dominated by the business
objective of getting inventories under better control, i.e., closer to the
desired balance with orders and sales. As long as new orders were
still much lower in value than production and shipments, their slow
recovery could be met by a retardation rather than by a reversal of such
contractionary adjustment processes as the reduction of output sched-
ules and inventory liquidation. Thus output and shipments continued
to decline mildly through the first three quarters of 1954, and turned
up only after incoming orders finally caught up with shipments, and
backlogs stopped declining.
Inspection of charts for the component major industries confirms
that the long leads of new orders at the 1954 troughs in shipments rep-
resent a real and widespread phenomenon.6 As summarized in Table
4-5, column 6, new orders for each of the listed durable goods indus-
tries led shipments by intervals of considerable length (from 5—7 to
11—12 months). The 1954 episode contrasts in this respect with the
other trough zones in which the lags of shipments were generally short.
But then, consistent with the argument above, the declines in new
orders tended to be much shallower on these other occasions, and the
subsequent recoveries (whereby N regained the levels of S) were much
more vigorous.
The dating of the peaks associated with the recessions of 1957 and
6Fortotal durables, the trough in new orders is difficult to date because of the long flat bottom in
1953—54 (Chart 3-1). But the long lag of S relative to N in this period stands out clearly for total
manufacturing. For the major durable goods industries, the existence of similar lags at the 1954
revival is definitely indicated, despite some difficulty in detail occasioned here and there by the
erratic movements in the compared series. It may also be noted that the earlier OBE data for the
durable goods industries leave no doubt about the long lag of shipments in 1954 (see Moore, ed.,
BusinessCycle Indicators, Vol.I, Chart 14-I, p. 431).148Relationships Between New Orders, Production, and Shipments
1960 is made difficult by the "flattop" pattern of the series in 1955—5 6,
with superimposed large erratic fluctuations, and by the effects of the
steel strikes in 1956 and 1959. The long lag of shipments for total
durables behind the December 1955 peak in new orders illustrates well
the high sensitivity of relative timing measures to small differences in
trends. While the movement of N tended to be downward and that of
S upward in 1956 (Chart 3-1), these were both rather slow drifts inter-
rupted by shorter irregular variations. It could be argued that a second-
ary (somewhat lower) peak in new orders occurred late in 1956, just
a few months before the downturn in shipments, although the interpre-
tation underlying the long lead specified in Table 4-5 (column 7)
appears to be more consistent with our procedures and the data. On
the other hand, the corresponding lead of N relative to S for all manu-
facturing is as short as two months, simply because new orders rose
slightly during 1956 instead of declining slightly (otherwise, the series
for total manufacturing and total durables can be seen, in the charts, to
have followed a very similar course).
In 1959, new orders for both all manufacturing and total durables
reached their peaks in April, before the steel strike; but shipments
show in each case two peaks of about the same height, one in May or
June 1959 and another in January 1960 (Chart 3-1). The prestrike
downturns in S lagged the peaks in N by one or two months, as re-
corded in Table 4-6, column 9; the poststrike downturns in S lagged
the peaks in N by eight months. Matching the former turns and treat-
ing the latter ones as secondary is the preferred alternative here. The
other choice would appear to bias the results in the direction of overly
long lags. It may also be noted that in primary metals, the industry
principally affected by this disturbance, the prestrike peaks in both N
and S were definitely higher than the poststrike ones (Chart 3-2). Buy-
ing and deliveries were undoubtedly strongly stimulated by anticipa-
tion of the work stoppage; after the strike was over, the need to re-
plenish stocks caused a new rise in new orders, but one that was smaller
and very short-lived; and shipments, though they increased more and
ran higher than new orders, declined as promptly in 1960. The wide
repercussions of these developments are of interest: The double-peak
pattern in 1959—60 can be seen clearly in such diverse industries as
transportation equipment (motor vehicles) and the group of "other
durables."Timing Comparisons 149
Table 4-5 suggests that the leads of new orders may have become
shorter in the more recent years. In the five turning zones 1958—62,
long leads are few, while short leads and coincidences are relatively
frequent (columns 8—12). Moreover, Charts 3-1 and 3-2 show that the
paired series for N and S have tended to run closer together since the
late 1950's than they did earlier in the postwar period. The ratios of
unfilled orders to shipments (U/S) have been undergoing fluctuations
with decreasing amplitudes around distinctly downward trends. The
corresponding series on unfilled orders proper (in current dollars)
show much weaker trends; some of them seem to show mild downward
inclinations, but others have none.7 From all this one can infer that, in
the aggregate, producers in each of the major industries concerned
must have acquired the capacity to handle the same volume of orders
in less time.
Independent evidence suggests, in agreement with the above, that
the impressive growth of manufacturing capacity in the decade follow-
ing the war and immediate postwar readjustments may have come to
exceed the growth of manufacturing output.8 High average rates of in-
vestment in plant and equipment would indeed be expected in times of
strong pressures of demand against capacity, such as prevailed in large
areas of industry during those years (except only for the relatively
brief recession periods). However, by the late 1950's, the demand pres-
sures had apparently started to abate, and this at the very time when
industry had acquired an unprecedented ability to meet them without
undue strain. Later on, signs of excess capacities began to replace
those of excess demand, as the 1957—58 recession gave way to a rather
short and vigorless expansion, which was followed by another brief
recession in 1960 and then again by a very gradual recovery, inter-
rupted by temporary slowdowns, in 196 1—62. Not until very recently,
in 1964—65, did the extraordinarily long business expansion that
started early in 1961 develop a symptom that was particularly charac-
teristic of the previous upswings, namely, the outpacing of shipments
by the faster-rising new orders in manufacturing (see Chart 3-1).
Evidence on these points is presented in Chapter 6 (Charts 6-4 and 6-5 and the accompanying
text).
SAccordingto the estimates in BusinessPious for New Plants andEquipment, .4 izizual Surveys,
preparedby the McGraw-Hill Department of Economics, the index of manufacturing capacity,
1948 =100,stood at 167 by the end of 1957—an increase of two-thirds in nine years. Meanwhile.
the FRB index of manufacturing output (also 1948 =100)increased only to 141 in 1957.150Relationships Between New Orders, Production, and Shipments
A verage Measures of Relative Timing
Table 4-6 is based on the 108 individual timing comparisons listed in
Table 4-5, plus eight additional observations which cannot be assigned
to any of the twelve turning zones identified in the latter table.9 Ninety-
four of these measures refer to pairs of turning points marking major
movements that can definitely be classified as "specific cycles" under
the NBER criteria; twenty-two refer to "minor" turns marking shorter
but still distinct movements.
The total number of turns in shipments covered in Table 4-6 is 118,
and all but two of these are matched by like turns in new orders
(columns 2 and 3). There are more instances of unmatched turns in
new orders mainly because of the already noted extra declines in these
series during 195 1—52 (columns 1 and 3).
The means of the timing comparisons are all negative (columns 8
and 9), that is, new orders lead shipments in each of the industries at
both peaks and troughs by intervals long enough to be observable in
monthly data. Leads account for about 77 per cent of the observa-
tions, coincidences for 15 per cent, and lags for nearly 8 per cent. The
percentage of leads is larger at peaks than at troughs, while the reverse
is true of the percentage of exact coincidences.10 Most of the leads are
short as are virtually all the lags; consequently, the proportion of
"rough coincidences" is high (59 per cent), though still smaller than
that of leads.
Individual long leads influence most means but in a fairly moderate
degree. The medians are on the whole smaller than the means, but not
by very large amounts, and the two statistics yield similar rankings of
the industries. Our analysis here relies on the means, but elsewhere
medians have been used as well for closely related data (Table 6-6).
Most of the mean absolute deviations listed in the last two columns
of Table 4-6 vary between one and three months. In a normal distribu-
tion, 57.5 per cent of the observations would be within the range of
plus and minus one average deviation on both sides of the mean; in a
moderately skewed distribution, this would still be approximately
include the following (compare Chart 3-2): a lead of one month of N relative to S at the
1963 peakand the following1963 trough in primary metals and in blast furnaces. The other four
comparisons, all in transportation equipment,includeasix-monthlag atthe 1955—56peak in the
series,a one-month lead at the trough in the same period, coincident timing at the 1959 trough, and
a one-month lag at the 1960 peak.
10Atpeaks, the proportion of leads is approximately 81 per cent; of coincidences, 9 per cent; and
of lags, 10 per cent. At troughs, the corresponding figures are 73, 22, and 5 per cent.Timing Comparisons 151
true. Thus with a mean lead of, say, three months, most of the com-
parisons would be expected to fall in the class of leads of six months or
less; but the presumption of skewness means that among the observa-
tions outside that range long leads would be more frequent than short
lags.11
The peak-trough differences among the average leads of new orders
in column 8 seem to vary irregularly: for five industry groups, the peak
figures are the larger ones, but in five others, they are the smaller ones.
However, Table 4-5 suggests that the long leads of orders at the up-
turn were largely concentrated in one period, namely, in the zone of
troughs associated with the business revival of 1954. When this par-
ticular episode is excluded, considerably smaller average leads at
troughs are obtained, which tend to fall short of the corresponding
measures for peaks, as illustrated by the following figures:
A verage Lead of Orders
Peaks
(Table 4-5, Troughs
cot. 8) (excl. 1954)
Durable goods, total —5.6 —2.8
Primary metals —3.6 —3.5
Blast furnaces, steel mills —6.8 —4.2
Fabricated metals —2.2 —3.2
Electrical machinery —2.5 —0.4
Nonelectrical machinery —5.0 —4.0
Transportation equipment —2.2 —2.0
Other durable goods —0.8 0.0
Nondurable goods, total —2.0 —2.5
Reporting unfilled orders —4.0 —3.5
Wide fluctuations in demand and production will often give rise to
large variations in the degree of capacity utilization, from slack to
A comment may be added on the use of mean absolute deviations vis.à.vis that of standard
deviations, which have more convenient mathematical properties though a somewhat less simple
meaning. Given a specific distribution, the two measures are proportional. The ratio of the average
deviation to the standard deviation depends but slightly on the form of the distribution; for a variety
of forms, the constant of proportionality was found to be approximately 0.8 (see Robert G. Brown,
Smoothing,Forecasting, and Prediction of Discrete Tune Series, EnglewoodCliffs, N.J., 1962, pp.
282—90). This is also true for similar measures shown elsewhere in this book (Table 6-6): There the














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.154Relationships Between New Orders, Production, and Shipments
strain, while small movements in the broad range of normal operations
will have no comparable impact. Hence it would not be surprising to
find that large swings in new orders and shipments are associated with
greater discrepancies between these series than are observed in periods
of stable trends. The lags of shipments behind new orders may accord-
ingly also show a tendency to be longer for the major movements.
These notions receive some broad support from our charts; as sug-
gested before, the leads of new orders relative to shipments appear to
have decreased in recent years while the cyclical movements in these
series have become generally smaller. The tabulation below shows that
larger average leads of new orders are in fact obtained when those
observations that are associated with minor turns are excluded.12
Average Lead of New Orders Relative
to Shipments (in months)
Peaks Troughs
All Major All Major
(Table 4-6,Turns(Table 4-6,Turns
col. 8) Only cot. 8) Only
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All manufacturing industries —2.4 —2.5 —3.8 —4.0
Durable goods industries —5.6 —6.8 —4.6 —5.0
Primary metals —3.6 —4.2 —4.6 —5.2
Blast furnaces, steel mills —6.8 —11.5 —5.6 —8.0
Fabricated metal products —2.2 —2.7 —4.5 —5.4
Electrical machinery —2.5 —2.2 —1.2 0.0
Machinery except electrical —5.0 —5.5 —4.2 —5.0
Transportation equipment —2.2 —6.0 —3.8 —6.0
Timing Differences Among the Major Industries
The major industries in the Census-OBE compilation cannot be
divided between goods made to order and goods made to stock, but
can be grouped according to the durability of their products.13 It will
'2The excluded observations are those in columns 11 and 12 of Table 4-5 and those listed in note 9
above. For the group of other durable goods and the nondurable goods industries, all the comparisons
made refer to major turns.
See, however, the crude distinction, by the prevalent type of manufacture, drawn between the
major industries in Table 2-5, columns 3 and 4.Timing Comparisons 155
berecalled that the durable goods industries as a whole have very low
ratios of finished stocks to unfilled orders, and the total nondurables
very high ratios. This indicates that manufacture to order prevails
heavily among the former; and manufacture to stock, among the latter
(Chapter 2). Hence, one would expect the leads of new orders to be
substantially longer for the durable goods than for the nondurable
goods sector of manufacturing. In fact, the difference between the
respective averages is large, the typical lead being estimated as five
months for the durables and as two months at most, but probably less,
for the nondurables.14 However, the assumption underlying the data
is that all but four of the major nondurable goods industries produce
to stock only. There is reason to think that this assumption is not quite
valid (see Chapter 2, note 18 and the text to which the note applies).
To the extent that this is so, the true lead in the nondurables sector
may be understated, and, therefore, the difference between the aver-
ages is likely to be overstated. The industries in the nondurables sector
for which the reported new orders and shipments differ show an average
lead of incoming business of 3.1 months.
The averages for the major industries conceal wide differences in
length among the leads for the smaller and more homogeneous com-
ponent industries. Probably the most drastic example of this is pro-
vided by transportation equipment, which includes motor vehicles, and
parts made largely to stock and nonautomotive equipment made to
order, typically with long delivery lags. According to the data shown
in Chart 3-4 (which are of the pre-1963 vintage) the average lead of
new orders for nonautomotive transportation equipment was 11.5
months—by far the largest one of the major-industry leads. This is
understandable in view of the size and complexity of such items as
ships, airplanes, or locomotives. It will be recalled that the longest
average leads in Table 4-1, ranging from seven to eleven months, were
thbse of the three principal types of railroad equipment. Corroborating
evidence is also available for the aircraft industry. Chart 4-1 presents
the quarterly series on the aggregate value of new orders and ship-
ments of aircraft manufacturers, compiled by the Bureau of the Census
and the Civil Aeronautics Administration for 1948—60. The similarity
'4The average leads according to Standard and Poor's data for 1949—58 (Appendix B, Part 1) are
similar: 4.3 months for durables and 1.7 months for nondurables. Exclusion of the questionable
observations at the 1952—53 shipments turns (see Table 4-5,notej)woulddrastically reduce the
average lead for the nondurable goods sector.Note: Shaded areas represent business cycle contractions; unshaded areas, expan-
sions. Dots identify peaks and troughs of specific cycles in new orders; black triangles,
shipments. Circles and white triangles identify short cycles in new orders and shipments,
respectively.
Source: Bureau of the Census and Civil Aeronautics Administration (seasonal adjust-
ment by NBER). Data for the third and fourth quarters of 1950 and the first and second
quarters of 1951 are not available. For shipments, linear interpolation was used over the
period in question. New orders were estimated by adding to computed shipments the
change, during the given quarter, in the backlog of aircraft orders (computed from the
published Census-CAA figures on end-of-quarter backlogs). The resulting estimates for
both shipments and new orders agree well with related evidence (Standard and Poor's
monthly indexes of aircraft orders and sales; see App. C).
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Chart 4-1

















of the cyclical course of these series to that of the OBE series for total
nonautomotive transportation equipment (cf. Charts 3-6 and 4-1)
emphasizes the great importance of aircraft within that total. Aircraft
orders led at the sales peaks in the second quarter of 1953 and the third
quarter of 1957 by two and five quarters, respectively. No comparisons
at troughs are available.Timing Comparisons 157
A very different picture is presented by motor vehicles and parts,
where new orders moved ahead of shipments by much shorter and
more variable intervals (Chart 3-6). Here the timing relation is blurred
in the early 1950's, possibly reflecting the changes in the military-
civilian mix of demand during the Korean period, but the two series
are roughly coincident since 1955 (see the text accompanying Chart 3-6
on the corresponding contrast in relative amplitudes). In terms of
aggregate shipments and new orders, the motor vehicle subgroup is, of
course, much more important than the nonautomotive subgroup within
total transportation equipment. 15Accordingly,the timing measures for
transportation equipment as a whole differ sharply from those for the
nonautomotive group, and differ less from those for the motor vehicle
division. The timing relation between new orders and shipments of
total transportation equipment is difficult to establish, in large measure
because of the dichotomy just discussed.
In the two metalworking industries—primary metals and fabricated
metal products—new orders led shipments by about three to four
months, while the average lead of orders received by blast furnaces
and steel mills was as long as six months (Table 4-6). Electrical ma-
chinery shows short average delivery lags (two months), while the cor-
responding measures for nonelectrical machinery are in the 4—5months'
range. Aggregation is likely to suppress substantial differences among
the lead times for the components of these major industries. The aver-
ages for machinery, for example, include figures for heavy and special-
ized equipment as well as for more standardized and less complex
items. Data for individual types of equipment show considerable var-
iation here: In Table 4-1 the average lag of shipments is seven months
for electric overhead cranes and two months for woodworking machin-
ery. These comparisons are merely suggestive because the data cover
different periods. Timing measures based on the subdivisions of the
major-industry series for the durable goods sector (Appendix E, Part
1) will shed more light on this subject.
At the other end of the scale from nonautomotive transportation
equipment with its long delivery lags (averaging nearly one year) is the
group of "other durable goods industries" for which the lags are very
In terms of unfilled orders, on the other hand, motor vehicle manufacturers, who produce largely
to stock, are much less important. The aircraft industry alone held 28 per cent of total manufacturers'
unfilled orders in April 1956,whilethe motor vehicle industry held only 5 per cent of the total (see
Surveyof Current Business, June1956, p. 3).158Relationships Between New Orders, Production, and Shipments
short (averaging about one month). The main components of this group
are furniture; lumber; and stone, clay, and glass products. Furniture,
according to industry reports, is manufactured largely to order but ap-
parently at short notice; it has the second shortest shipment lag in Ta-
ble 4-1. Clay and glass products and lumber are made predominantly
to stock (Table 2-1), and the long records for oak flooring and southern
pine suggest that lumber products typically have short order leads (Ta-
ble 4-2).
Timing of Production Relative to New Orders
and Shipments in Real Terms
Table 4-7 shows the timing comparisons between deflated new or-
ders and production for each of the eight "turning zones" that can be
identified from the data in the period 1948—58. These measures are
based on the deflated series and indexes introduced in Chapter 3 (the
pre-1963 OBE data); in reading the table and the comments below, it
will be helpful to consult Charts 3-5 and 3-6.
The measures for total manufacturing and the durable goods sector
indicate that outputs were quite slow to follow new orders at peaks as-
sociated with the recessions of 1953 and 1957 and at troughs of the
intervening revival period of 1954. On these occasions, production and
new orders in constant prices tended to move in opposite directions
for as long as 7 to 15 months. These observations must be qualified by
noting that such divergent movements in these aggregates were typi-
cally very gradual, sloping gently upward or downward in the vicinity
of their turning points; also, that the developments were influenced by
outside events, notably the 1956 steel strike. Nevertheless, the con-
clusion that production lags were relatively long in these periods is not
really in doubt. In 1948 and again in 1949, production turned four
after new orders in constant prices for both total manufactur-
ing and the durable goods sector as a whole; and at the 1958 upturns
the lags of outputs were generally still shorter in the manufacturing in-
dustries (compare columns 1—2 and 5—8 in Table 4-7).
The volume of manufacturers' unfilled orders varied greatly over the
period 1948—58, both absolutely and relative to production and ship-
ments, and one would expect the lags of output to be longer when or-
der backlogs are larger. Between 1952 and 1956, unfilled orders and
their ratios to shipments were indeed much larger than in 1948—49 andTiming Comparisons 159
in 1958. But other factors, in particular, autonomous expectations con-
cerning future demand trends, undoubtedly also influence the relative
timing of production.
The large waves of forward buying that marked the first year of the
Korean War were not replicated in the flow of output, which instead
was well maintained at high rates during that period. Aggregate pro-
duction of durable goods underwent only a mild and brief decline at the
end of this phase, in mid-1951, and gained slowly but steadily there-
after, while current ordering was hesitant and very erratic. Even if
direct timing comparisons cannot be made here because there are no
turns in output to match those in new orders, this should not obscure
the substantial lag of production behind orders at that time, in the
sense that the sustained strength of production reflected the great ac-
cumulation of unfilled orders in the months past. The vigor with which
production rebounded after the interruption of the steel strike in mid-
1952 must have still been due in large measure to that backlog factor,
since new orders were not gaining much in the second half of 1952 and
were weakening perceptibly in the first half of 1953.
An important observation that can be made with the aid of Table 4-7
and Charts 3-5 and 3-6 is that outputs lag significantly behind new or-
ders in constant prices not only for durable goods but also for non-
durable goods. As stressed before, production to order plays a much
smaller role for nondurables than for durables. Production to stock,
which prevails in industries manufacturing nondurable goods, is pre-
sumably scheduled largely according to market sales forecasts. The
finding that outputs tend to follow new orders in these industries in-
dicates, therefore, that new orders serve as an important basis for such
forecasts (see section on "Sales Forecasts" near the end of Chapter 2).
Since new orders are measures of past sales, this argument implies also
that sales forecasts contain substantial "autoregressive" elements; that
is, future sales (outputs needed) are predicted to a large extent by ex-
trapolating past sales, a plausible though somewhat speculative infer-
ence.'6
10Thatprojections of past events are commonly used as tools of prediction requires little proof
or elaboration; after all, there is often little else to go by. Autoregressive forecasts will earn a measure
of success if applied to time series whose successive values are sufficiently correlated with each
other. The relatively smooth series for nondurable goods producers suggest that this requirement
may be satisfied by sales of many individual companies in this group (even though individual sales


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Notes to Table 4-7
n.j. =notidentified (timing uncertain).
n.a. =datanot available.
n.p. =nomatching turn in production.
aThesepairs of peaks and troughs represent "extra" turns, not related to any
cyclical recession or revival recognized in the National Bureau chronology of U.S.
business cycles.
bBasedon turns in short cycles or retardations in deflated new orders or production.
Although a few of these comparisons are somewhat doubtful, they are listed in the table
and included in the averages of columns 9— Ii (the more uncertain cases are mentioned
in the notes below).
Based in part on unpublished data received from the U.S. Department of Commerce,
Office of Business Economics.
dAsecondary peak in new orders occurred in October 1956, two months before the
specific-cycle peak in production.
Based on unpublished data received from the OBE and seasonally adjusted by the
Census electronic computer method for the NBER.
1Timing of the trough in new orders is uncertain, but the low in this series occurred in
July 1949, eight months before the trough in production.
Includes professional and scientific instruments; lumber; furniture; stone, clay, and
glass; and miscellaneous industries.
hInthe period covered by this long lead, the decline in new orders and the rise in
production were very gentle, but the direction of these movements is clear.
'Includes textiles, leather, paper, and printing and publishing.
1Timing of the high values in 1948 indicates that new orders led production by two
months for the group of nondurable goods industries with unfilled orders and by one
month for leather, but the comparisons are uncertain.
kMeasuredfrom the early peak of new orders in July 1955 to the beginning of a long
movement of production along a high plateau (January 1956—September 1957). An un-
certain but conservative estimate of the lead.
While the tendency for deflated new orders to anticipate outputs is
distinct enough in the nondurable goods sector (both total and those
industries reporting unfilled orders), the resulting leads are on the
whole shorter than those observed for the durable goods industries
(compare the aggregates in Table 4-7). Production of nondurables
definitely declined in 1951, responding to the contraction of quantities
newly ordered and shipped in the third quarter of 1950 and the first
half of 1951 (Chart 3-5). This is unlike the concurrent developments in
the durable goods sector, where production, reacting to similar but
much larger relative movements of new orders, merely flattened off in
1951. Thus the distributed-lag process, whereby large fluctuations in
the receipts of orders are smoothed out in the course of production, is162Relationships Between New Orders, Production, and Shipments
strongly in evidence here for the durables, much less so for the non-
durables.
The average leads of deflated new orders at turns in outputs suggest
considerable differences among the industries, some of which may be
recognized as familiar and reasonable (note, for example, the long
leads recorded in Table 4-7 for nonautomotive transportation equip-
ment). It is interesting to observe that the average leads tend to be
longer at peaks than at troughs (columns 9 and 10).
In about 80 per cent of the observations listed in Table 4-7, deflated
new orders lead output, demonstrating the regularity with which this
behavior occurs. More than 90 per cent of the recorded turning points
in production and orders can be matched with each other, which indi-
cates that the correlation between the cyclical movements in these
series is high indeed.
It remains to compare the timing of turning points in production and
shipments in constant prices, on which the series for 1948—58 yielded
69 observations. The results may be summarized without being shown
in tabulated form. As suggested by Charts 3-5and3-6, output and de-
flated shipments tend to rise and decline at about the same time. In-
deed, nearly 70 per cent of the timing comparisons between these
series are rough coincidences, that is, leads or lags of less than three
months and exact coincidences (the latter alone account for slightly
more than 20 per cent of the observations).
In the model of pure production to order, output should precede
shipments, although by very short intervals, as a simple technical
matter. In the model of pure production to stock, on the other hand,
output could either anticipate or follow shipments, but the latter alter-
native is more likely because of uncertainty about future demand. The
first of these statements is logically compelling, the second is per-
suasive, and both are already familiar; but it is difficult to demonstrate
either of them empirically with the comprehensive series on hand.
Nevertheless, it may be worth noting that lags of output relative to de-
flated shipments are much more frequent than leads for the nondurable
goods industries and for the "other durable goods" group, where pro-
duction to stock dominates (there are 19 lags, 4 leads, and S coinci-
dences in this set of comparisons). For the remaining industries that
account for most of the durable products manufactured in large part to
order, leads of output vis-à-vis real shipments are as numerous as lagsTiming Comparisons 163
(the count here is 15 lags, 15 leads, and 11 coincidences). These dif-
ferences may not be very sharp, but they do seem broadly reasonable.
Market Categories
Consumer Goods, Equipment, and Materials
The new Census series on new orders and shipments classified by
market categories were described in Chapter 3 and are shown in
Chart 3-3. Table 4-8 presents the measures of relative timing for
these data.
In general, new orders and shipments of consumer goods move
closely together and have synchronous timing. For the nondurable
"consumer staples," the two series are dominated by trends and follow
an identical upward course. No timing comparisons are made here, as
there are no major fluctuations and turning points, but Chart 3-3 makes
it clear that any deviations between N and S for this category are small
and apparently random. The short series for consumer durables (other
than automobiles), which begin in 1960, also contribute no observa-
tions to Table 4-8. They too show closely similar and coincident move-
ments, consisting of a mild decline during the 1960—61 recession and a
marked upward trend thereafter (Chart 3-3). Home goods and ap-
parel, a group including nonautomotive household equipment and some
nondurables, does provide several turning-point comparisons which
clearly indicate coincident timing' of new orders and shipments (Table
4-8).
In contrast, shipments of equipment for industrial and commercial
uses fluctuate much less than, and definitely lag behind, new orders.
The lags, as measured at the recent turning points, average about five
months (fourth line). The longest delivery lags, as well as the largest
differences in amplitude between new orders and shipments, are for
the defense products: Defense orders lead shipments by 11 to 14
months.
The most variable, or least regular, of the timing relations appears to
be that for automotive equipment (fifth line), but Chart 3-3 shows that
substantial deviations between N and S have occurred here on only a
few occasions in the early part of the period covered, notably in



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Notes to Table 4-8
aForcomposition of these categories, see Chapter 3.
bForthese items, new orders and shipments show mild but distinct declines in 1962,
corresponding to the retardation of the general business expansion in that year. The
tabulation below show the timing comparisons between the resulting minor turns and
the averages including these additional observations:
Lead (—) Av.Lead (—)orLag (+),Av. Dev.
or Lag (+) of 1954—62 (mci. 1962frpm Av.





defense products 0 —2 —3.3 —4.8 —4.1 2.7
Machinery and equipment in-
dustries —4 —4 —5.7 —5.0 —5.3 1.8
Materials, supplies, and inter-
mediate products —2 —6 —2.7 —4.8 —3.9 2.4
Construction materials 0 0 —0.3 —0.3 —0.3 0.4
Other materials —2 —4 —3.3 —4.5 —4.0 2.3
Timing of new orders is uncertain, but the lead appears to be at least 9 months. If
this observation were included, the averages would read —6.0 for troughs and —5.4
(with an average deviation of 2.3) for all turns (compare the entries in columns 7—9 in
this line).
ciTheaverages include two timing comparisons (—5 for troughs and +1 for peaks) in
addition to those listed to the left. These observations relate to the extra rises in 1956—57
(see Chart 3-3).
much to the same course; and since 1959theyhave followed even
more closely similar paths, with simultaneous timing. This type of be-
havior would be expected in the light of the earlier discussion, since
motor vehicles account for the bulk of the output in this market cate-
gory.
Approximately coincident timing is characteristic of new orders and
shipments in the construction materials group, while leads of orders
prevail in the group of other materials, where they average about four
months. Shipments in the latter category, which includes most of the
output of the sensitive metalworking industries that produce typically
to order, are about four to five times as large as in the former. Accord-
ingly, the relative timing measures for total materials, supplies, and in-
termediate products reflect primarily the measures for "other materials,
etc." rather than those for construction materials.166Relationships Between New Orders, Production, and Shipments
Before the official market-category data were first published, in
1963, an attempt was made to construct for this study series on the
current value of new orders and shipments for materials, consumer dur-
able goods, and equipment. The idea was simply to group the industries
in the detailed OBE classification used in Table A-I in Appendix A
into categories representing primarily the production of the above types
of goods. The resulting estimates, which cover 1948—6 1, are inevitably
crude. Nevertheless, the summary measures based on these approxi-
mations do not seem altogether unreasonable. 17Inparticular, the aver-
age timing measures obtained from the old data are broadly consistent
with the presumably more reliable evidence of the recent market-cat-
egory series as reported in Table 4-8 for 1954_62.18
Defense Products
While the bulk of orders received by manufacturers comes from the
private business sector of the American economy, the amounts placed
by the U.S. government and by foreign buyers are large, and their
change over time is of much interest. Regrettably, comprehensive se-
ries on government and foreign orders have not been compiled for any
extended length of time. Only some selected and fragmentary informa-
tion is available, but it deserves attention.'9
Special interest centers on military orders, both because of their size
and the presumption that they may differ considerably from civilian
orders and thus have a particular role as a major "exogenous" factor.
Also, this is the only class of government orders on which there exists
a significant amount of aggregative data.
The impact of the defense program on the economy results from fis-
cal measures that are expressed in two sets of data: obligations and ex-
Asummary of measures of cyclical conformity, timing, and amplitude for the grouped series
and the constructed aggregates was published in The Uses of Economic Research, Forty-third An-
nual Report of the National Bureau of Economic Research, New York, 1963, pp. 66—68.
18 classofconsumer durables based on the old data includes motor vehicles, which in the
newclassification are treated separately as part of "automotive equipment." The mean leads here
are two months or a little more, which is probably not very different from what would be obtained
by combining the new series for consumer durables and motor vehicles (as a rough approximation,
consider a weighted aggregate of the items in the first and fifth lines of Table 4-8). Most of the es-
timates for equipment from the old data suggest an average lead of new orders of about five months,
and a very similar timing is indicated by the measures for the new series on nonautomotive equip-
ment other than defense products. For materials, the leads based on the 1948—61 estimates average
somewhat less than what is indicated by the new series for 1954—62 in Table 4-8, but the estimates
all lie in the relatively narrow range of two to four months.
19Dataon export orders and shipments are particularly limited, and they refer to a rather special
subject. For these reasons, the discussion of the export series is included inAppendixF.Timing Comparisons 167
penditures. Obligations measure the value of contract placements and
other work undertaken during the given period. Expenditures represent
the actual payments made in a given period against obligations made
at earlier times. What the Defense Department defines as an "obliga-
tion" for hard goods is thus, as a rule, a "new order" to a durable goods
manufacturer. On the other hand, "expenditures" on hard goods for
defense are part of the payment for shipments from a durable goods
manufacturer and are therefore roughly comparable to the value of
manufacturers' shipments for the goods.2°
Chart 4-2 shows two pairs of quarterly, seasonally adjusted series.
The two curves in the lower part, covering the period 1950—62, repre-
sent Department of Defense obligations and net expenditures for pro-
curement and research, development, and testing and evaluation.21 The
two upper curves trace the course of new orders and shipments for
defense products according to the new Census data on "market cate-
gories," which begin in 1953.
The movements of expenditures, like those of shipments, arethe
most part rather small, smooth, and gradual from quarter to quarter.
In contrast, obligations, like new orders, show much greater short-term
variability, both of the apparently "systematic" movements and the
shorter "irregular" fluctuations. The largest deviations between the
matched series occurred during the Korean War: Obligations greatly
exceeded expenditures from mid-1950 to mid-1952, then fell precipi-
tously below expenditures through 1953. In this period, the basic
movements in the two series were so large and sustained that they
agreed in direction most of the time, despite the long lag of expendi-
tures visible at the 1952—53 peaks. At other times, however, when the
fluctuations in obligations were shorter, the two series often moved in
20 foregoingexplanation of the obligations and expenditure data is based on the testimony of
Charles J. Hitch, Assistant Secretary of Defense, HearingsontheEconomicReport of the Pres-
ident, 1961, Joint Economic Committee, 87th Cong., 1st sess., Washington, D.C., 1961, p. 616.
21Thesource of the fiscal-year totals for the entire period covered and of the quarterly data since
111-1953 is the Department of Defense, Monthly Report of the Status of Funds. The figures for the
period 1I-1950—IV-1960 are taken from Hitch, Hearings, pp. 667—68 (the data through 11-1953 are
estimated). The figures for the period since 1-1961 are taken directly from the Monthly Reports.
Seasonal adjustments were made for NBER by the Census electronic computer method.
The categories included are: (1) the purchase of major items of equipment such as aircraft, mis-
siles, ships, tanks, vehicles, artillery, electronics, ammunition, etc.; and (2) the support of research,
development of new weapons and equipment, procurement of items under development for eval-
uation, and the maintenance of laboratories and test facilities. The data cover "hard goods" and ex-

































































































































































































































































































































































































































opposite directions.22 From 1957—58 on, a substantial stabilization was
achieved, with obligations showing the same slow upward trend as ex-
penditures but much larger irregular movements around that trend.
The relationship of new orders for, and shipments of, defense prod-
ucts is similar to that of defense obligations and expenditures, and the
trends in the two pairs of series have a broad resemblance over the
period of overlap (1953—62). The shorter movements frequently di-
verge, as might be expected, but even they show at times a fair amount
of
The Census series of new orders and shipments for defense-oriented
products run at considerably higher levels than the Department of
Defense series of obligations and expenditures. For example, Census
shipments totaled $21.9 billion in 1960, while Defense expenditures
totaled $17.9 billion, that is, about 18 per cent less. It seems likely that
the Census figures are overstated because they include nondefense
purchases of outputs of the industries classified as "defense-oriented"
(communication equipment, aircraft and parts, and ordnance).24
The contrast between the large fluctuations of defense obligations
and orders on the one hand, and the smooth and relatively mild move-
ments of defense expenditures and shipments on the other hand, de-
serves to be stressed. The Defense Department series suggest that
delivery periods for military hardware are on the whole quite long,
though they may vary considerably for different items and perhaps also
for different periods. (The Korean developments of the early 1950's
were associated with a particularly large wave in obligations which
could not help but cause severe strains on the industries affected.)
Direct timing comparisons for the Census series, though they are few
and difficult, certainly indicate that defense shipments lag behind new
orders by long intervals (Table 4-7, third line). What the data suggest,
then, is what would be expected, namely, that expenditures, like de-
double rise-and-fall sequence in obligations during the period from 111-1953 to 11-1957 is
an example. Expenditures followed a gradual downward course between 11-1953 and 111-1956 (see
Chart 4-2).
in particular the similarity between the trough-peak-trough patterns of new orders and
obligations in 1955—56—57. As an example of more divergent movements, compare the two series in
1953—55: The sharp peak of obligations in IV-1954 has no counterpart in new orders.
24 areother sources of divergence between the two sets of data, some of which would work
in the opposite direction, but these are probably much less important. The Defense series of obli-
gations are "gross" in the sense of including some interdepartmental transactions, but the amount
of the resulting double counting (which cannot be eliminated) is said to be "relatively modest and
fairly constant from year to year" (Hitch, Hearings. p. 616).170Relationships Between New Orders, Production, and Shipments
liveries and installations, follow orders with substantial distributed
lags.25
By subtracting defense obligations or orders from total new orders
of durable goods manufacturers and defense expenditures or ship-
ments from total shipments of these manufacturers, a crude picture
can be obtained of the recent changes in the corresponding "civilian"
series. It is shown in Chart
Afterexpanding vigorously in the first nine months of the Korean
War period, business ceased gaining or started contracting in many
sectors—primarily those industries whose sales depend in the main on
household spending and residential construction. Industries related to
defense, however, continued experiencing increases in activity.27 Our
graph shows that the aggregate of new durables orders from civilian
buyers declined sharply in 1951, changed little during most of 1952,
and recovered decisively only in 1953. In contrast, defense obligations
had a strong upward trend in the first two years of the conflict, i.e.,
through mid-1952 (Chart 4-2). As a consequence, total new orders for
durable goods showed considerably more strength in 1952 than did the
civilian orders (Chart 4-3), which suggests that defense buying had a
substantial stimulative effect in this period.
In the last months of 1952 and through 1953, new purchase commit-
ments for defense declined sharply (Chart 4-2), thereby assuming tem-
porarily the opposite role of a depressant. Manufacturers' new orders
turned down in the first quarter of 1953, and shipments turned down in
the second (Chart 4-3); one suspects that the cutbacks in military or-
ders contributed significantly to these reversals. However, simple
graphical comparisons are not sufficient to analyze such relationships.
Since the levels of the defense series are low relative to the correspond-
ing totals for durable manufactures, the civilian components must bulk
It appears plausible that expenditures should be more evenly distributed over time than ship-
ments or deliveries, particularly in the case of contracts concerning large and complex items or
"jobs." This point is difficult to test with our fragmentary data. In Chart 4-2, expenditures seem a
little more erratic than shipments, but this may be due to differences in aggregation. Expenditures
did follow the upward course rather more consistently thanshipmentsin the years 1956—62.
26Defenseobligations and expenditures were used to compute the civilian series shown in the
chart as broken curves for 1950—54; defense orders and shipments were used to compute the civilian
series shown as solid curves for 1953—65. For 1953—62, the analysis was carried out in two alterna-
tive variants, based on the Defense and on the Census data. The two variables differ in some details
but support about the same broad conclusions.
These developments can be inferred from the behavior of the GNP components and other ag-
gregative series. See Bert 0. Hickman, TheKorean War and United States Economic Activity,
1950—1952, OccasionalPaper 49, New York, NBER, 1955,pp.21—23.Timing Comparisons 171
Billion dollars
Chart 4-3
New Orders and Shipments of Durable Manufactures and Their
Estimated "Civilian" Components, Quarterly, 1950—65
Billion dollars
Note: Shaded areas represent business cycle contractions; unshaded areas, expansions. Dots
identify peaks and troughs of specific cycles in the civilian series; black triangles, in the totals. Series
are seasonally adjusted.
Source: Total new orders and shipments: Bureau of the Census. Civilian new orders and shipments:
estimates based on Commerce and Defense Department data.172Relationships Between New Orders, Production, and Shipments
large in the totals; hence, these totals must be closely correlated with
their civilian components. The general impression conveyed by Chart
4-3 is indeed that of a parallelism between the total and the civilian se-
ries for either variable. The paired series draw apart when the defense
component grows larger and draw together when the defense compo-
nent is reduced, as illustrated by the curves for new orders in 1951—52
and in 1953.
It should also be realized that the residual method of computing ci-
vilian orders and shipments is in one sense apt to underestimate the
influence of defense purchases. Increasing defense obligations pre-
sumably give rise to new orders by the contractors themselves, since
the contractors need to acquire inputs for the handling of the govern-
ment orders. Durable goods orders of this kind are included in Chart
4-3 in the series on civilian orders. In short, the civilian series reflect
all the indirect (positive and negative) "multiplier" effects of military
purchases. They exclude only the direct effects measured by the de-
fense series themselves.
The 1957—58 recession was also preceded by a decline in defense
obligations and orders, which, however, was much milder and shorter
than the contraction in obligations that occurred before (and partly
during) the 1953—54 recession. The defense cutbacks were not only
much smaller than those initiated in 1952, they were also much more
quickly reversed.28 Expenditures of the Defense Department, as here
measured, did not decline significantly in 1957—58, whereas they did
during the previous recession (Chart 4-3). These observations suggest
that in 1957, unlike 1953, the defense cutbacks did not constitute a
major factor in the recession.
In the 1958—60—61 cycle the defense series varied less than in the
earlier postwar cycles. There is an indication of the 1959—60 budget
tightness in these series, particularly in obligations from 111-1959 to
1-1960 after which expenditures and shipments rose fairly steadily and
Defenseobligationswereallowed tofall to a nadir of $0.6 billion in IV-1953 and theywere
stilllow, thoughdefinitelygaining, in the first half of 1954 (Chart 4-2). As concern grew over the
continuing recession, thegovernmentdecided,in May, to allocate a largerportion of the funds budg-
eted for fiscal 1955 to the next fewmonths(see Wilfred Lewis, Jr., FederalFiscal Policy inthePost-
war Recessions, Washington, D.C., BrookingsInstitution,1962, pp. 165—87). The defense programs,
particularlyobligations, accounted for the great bulk of this intrafiscat shift. Most of the increase
in the first half of the fiscal year appears to have been offset by reductions in the second half (corn-
pare Chart 4-2 for about 1954—55). In 1958, efforts to speed up government spending were again
made, but this time defense procurement was to be excluded from that policy.Timing Comparisons 173
obligations and orders increased at a similar over-all pace, with some
occasional spurts and falls. A large increase in military new orders and
stepped-up deliveries began late in 1964 and continued in 1965—68,
reflecting the steady intensification and painful persistence of the war
in Vietnam (Chart 3-2). At the end of 1968, new orders of defense
product industries reached an annual rate of $50 billion, and Depart-
ment of Defense gross obligations incurred for procurement alone rose
to a rate of $27 billion. Afterward, orders and obligations began to de-
cline slowly from these peak levels, while shipments and expenditures
were still a little lower than orders and still creeping upward. Finally,
late in 1969, defense expenditures did turn gradually downward, but
new orders and obligations gained again. In this period of war and in-
flation, as in others before, there is little doubt about the inflationary
effects of huge increases in military outlays (not offset by reduction in
civilian demand).
In conclusion, new orders for defense products undergo large irreg-
ular variations, which can be and sometimes are an important source
of economic instability. But these movements have sometimes been
stabilizing, too, and they are always strongly smoothed in the produc-
tion process as well as in expenditures.
Summary
New orders systematically lead shipments of those individual indus-
tries or products that represent goods manufactured primarily to order.
Leads of N relative to S also prevail in the timing observations for a
sampLe of goods made largely to stock, but they are both shorter and
less regular. Similar distinctions can be made among the lags of output
behind new orders in physical terms.
According to the postwar aggregate value data, the leads of new or-
ders at turns in shipments are substantially larger for the durable goods
sector of manufacturing than for the nondurables one: The respective
average leads are about five months and two months or less. In general,
the results conform to expectations in that the lags of shipments are
longest for heavy, made-to-order equipment and the shortest for stand-
ardized items.
Except for the particular episode of long lags of shipments at the174Relationships Between New Orders, Production, and Shipments
upturns associated with the business revival of 1954, new orders have
typically preceded deliveries by longer intervals at peaks than at
troughs. This would be expected, since the capacity position of many
firms is presumably strained at the top levels of aggregate output. The
data also suggest that the delivery lags became on the whole shorter
in the late fifties and early sixties as compared with their average dura-
tion in the earlier postwar years. This is attributed to both the relative
easing of demand pressures and the completion of large build-ups of
manufacturing capacity in the period between the end of the Korean
War and the escalation of the war in Vietnam.
Production indexes for durable goods have lagged behind deflated
new orders by substantial intervals, especially at peaks. Importantly,
significant (although much shorter) lags of output are also observed for
nondurable goods. Autoregressive sales forecasts based on recent
order figures could help account for such lags in production to stock.
The timing of production relative to shipments in constant prices is
on the average roughly coincident for the comprehensive aggregates,
with some tendency to lag in the stock-oriented nondurable goods
industries.
Comparisons for the new market-category series show approxi-
mately coincident timing of N and S for consumer goods and con-
struction materials. Shipments of metal products and equipment for
commercial and industrial uses lagged by some 4 or 5 months, on the
average. The longest delivery lags, of 11—14 months, are observed for
the defense products.